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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----00000----
THORN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANS-
PORTATION, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
----00000----
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF 
TRANSPORTATION 
----00000----
Case No. 15647 · 
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STATEMENT OF THE KlND OF CASE 
This case arises out of a construction con-
tract and involves the interpretation of contract speci-
fications and whether the Respondent contractor is ob-
ligated to follow the contract as it is written or is 
excused from compliance with certain provisions regarding 
notice. Finally, the case involves the question of the 
amount of damages the Respondent is entitled to recover. 
DlSPOSlTlON lN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, the Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow presiding, awarded Plaintiff-Respondent 
Thorn Construction Company judgment against Defendant-
Appellant for the sum of $24,500.00. This trial Judge 
determined that Respondent was entitled to additional com-
pensation over and above contract unit prices for certain 
changes in the contract and that Respondent was excused 
from specification requirements to file notice of its in-
tent to claim compensation or to provide details regarding 
how its unit prices were affected to Appellant. Finally, 
the Court allowed Respondent to present its evidence of 
alleged damages based on a "total cost" theory of damages 
over objections by Appellant. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment in 
favor of Respondent for $24,500.00 and in lieu thereof 
a judgment for the sum of $1,791.30, which amount was con-
ceded by Appellant as due and owing based on an analysis 
of the unit cost for borrow material. 
In the alternative, Appellant seeks a new trial 
with instructions that Respondent is not excused from 
compliance with contract provisions relative to notice 
of intended claims and from the requirement to base its 
claims for additional compensation upon detailed informa-
tion related to changes in contract unit costs. Further, 
Appellant requests that the Court determine that Respon-
dent cannot use the "total cost" approach as its method , 
of establishing compensation. 
As a further alternative, Appellant seeks a 
reduction in the judgment to correspond with the evidence 
before the Court. 
FACTS 
The parties on March 27, 1973, entered into a 
contract, a part of which was for construction of an access 
road at Rockport State Park. 
-2-
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Part of the contract provided for the im-
portation of 28,100 cubic yards of borrow material. 
Section 106.02 of the State of Utah Standard Specifications 
for Road and Bridge Construction (1970 Edition), herein-
after "Standard Specifications," sets forth the require-
ments for suitability of such material. Neither the con-
tract special provisions nor plans specify any source for 
the borrow material. The contractor determined his own 
source as provided in Section 106.02 of the Standard Speci-
fications, and the State tested it for suitability. 
Prior to submitting its bid, representatives 
of the Respondent visited the work site and Appellant's 
employee, Virgil Mitchell, accompanied them on an inspec-
tion. A "possible source'' (R. 8, 10) referred to as the 
"Utelite Pit" was viewed. Virgil Mitchell was not the 
project engineer, and he had not been authorized by the 
engineer as his agent to make representations concerning 
the plans for the project. Mitchell is not trained or ex-
perienced in testing for suitability of materials, and he 
did not know of any previous use of the "Utelite Pit!" 
(R. 188-189) He simply stated that the source could Pprob-
ably be used." (R. 8, 10) At the pre-construction confer-
ence Respondent stated it would use the PUtelite Pit" as 
its borrow site. When the source was tested in August of 
1973, it was found to be unsuitable. (R. 37) Respondent 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
thereafter obtained suitable borrow material from Orland 
Crandall in Peoa. The increased distance one way to the 
alternate source is 1.7 miles. (R. 89) No notice either 
verbally or in writing was transmitted to Appellant by 
Respondent regarding a claim for additional compensation 
for the increased haul distance during the project. (R. 40) 
Specification No. 105.17 states that notice in writing is 
a pre-condition to a claim for additional compensation 
prior to doing the work. (Exh. D-1) 
The actual measured quantity of roadway excava-
tion was determined to be 15,305 cubic yards after the pro-· 
ject was completed. This is more than a 25% underrun in the 
proposed quantity. Section 104.02 of the Standard Speci-
fications states that Respondent can "demand a supplemental 
agreement." That section allows for price adjustments, but 
does not allow for anticipated profit. (Exh. D-1) Appellant 
requested data from Respondent regarding how its bid price 
was calculated, but Respondent refused to supply said data 
until trial of this matter. (R. 69, 88) The evidence shows 
that Respondent based its bid as follows: 
Loading, hauling, placing 
and compacting 
Fixed costs, overhead and 
profit 
,95 
TOTAL • • • • • • • • • 1. 20 (R. 88) 
-4-
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During the project it was determined by Ap-
pellant that certain approaches and turns should be widened. 
On September 6, 1973 or thereabout, the Respondent was di-
rected by the project engineer to accomplish the necessary 
widening. (R. 47) No amount was agreed upon or discussed 
as payment for this extra work. The Respondent did not 
notify Appellant in writing that it would claim additional 
payment before doing the work. (R. 40, SO) Respondent al-
leged that its records showed a total cost of doing this 
work in the amount of $56,985.07. (R. 63) This amount was 
calculated using actual paid labor and equipment based on 
rental rates established by the Associated General Contractors 
{AGC). To this amount was added certain factors for overhead 
and profit, which are percentages of the total. Respondent 
did not offer ~vidence to show how its "unit costsP were af-
fected by the change in plan. (R. 65, 66) Respondent deducted 
payments made by Appellant at the unit price as bid leaving a 
balance of $38,642.83. Appellant's evidence shows that 
$1,79i.30 would be due Respondent for the quantity underrun. 
(R. 280) 
The matter was tried to the Court, the Honorable 
Marcellus K. snow presiding, on September 22, 1977, and judg-
ment was entered on the 6th day of January, 1978, for the S\DD 
of $24,500.00. 
Appellant thereafter filed this appeal. 
-s-
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POINT I 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELY ON 
REPRESENTATIONS, IF ANY, BY VIRGIL 
MITCHELL, OR RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED TO 
CLAIM THAT THERE WERE REPRESENTATIONS 
BECAUSE THE CONVERSATION WAS "MERGED" 
IN THE CONTRACT. 
A. NO RIGHT TO RELY ON STATEMENTS OF VIRGIL MITCHELL. 
Respondent 1 s evidence at trial showed that Grant 
Thorn, Jerry Thorn, Jack Jones and Larry Davis as representa· 
tives of Respondent Corporation visited the job site on the 
19th of March of 1973 prior to submitting its bid. (R. 7) 
Said individuals have spent most of their adult lives in corr. 
struction work, and Larry Davis is a graduate civil engineer. 
(R. 9, 11, 28) Said company has for years engaged in highwa:' 
construction and has specialized in highway paving work. Sa: 
company also has operated and carried on sand, gravel and rq 
mix operations. (R. 28) 
At the time Respondent 1 s agents visisted the job 
site, an employee of the Appellant, Virgil Mitchell, toured 
the area of the job site with said individuals. The evidenc 
shows that the said Mitchell has been employed by the Ap-
pellant for twenty-four years. During that time he has 
not worked in the area of materials, testing or inspection, 
and he has no training or education in materials. (R. 188) 
The evidence further showed that he knew nothing about the 
adequacy of the material on the Utelite property, didn't 
I 
know of its being used by others or anything about that pit r' 
I 
-6-
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site, except that it was available as a "possible" borrow 
source. (R. 188, 189) (Also, see Finding of Fact No. 4) 
Grant Thorn stated that Virgil Mitchell showed 
them the pit as a "possible source" for borrow material. 
(R. 8, 10, 12) 
The Court in its Finding of Fact No. 5 has 
stated the following: 
Relying on the representations of 
Mr. Mitchell, Thorn entered its bid in con-
nection with the Wanship highway construction 
project and calculated the bit item of borrow 
on the basis of Mr. Mitchell's representations 
that the material from the Utelite pit could 
be used as borrow on the construction project. 
The record further shows that Mitchell had not 
been designated by the Appellant's engineer, Ed Watson, to 
represent him or to make any representations concerning the 
project or any work items, and particularly materials. (R. 
189-193) 
The record does not disclose that Mitchell made 
any representations concerning the borrow material in the 
Utelite pit as to its suitability or availability other than 
as a "possible source." (R. 8, 10, 12, 189-193) 
The State of Utah Standard Specifications for 
Road and Bridge Construction (1970 Edition} which are in-
corporated as part of the contract (Exh. D-1) state the fol-
lowing with regard to examination of the work: 
Section 102.05. Examination of flans, . 
specifications, special provisions and site of -
work: The department will prepar7 ~ull! com-
plete and accurate plans and specifications 
-7-
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giving such directions as will enable 
any competent contractor to carry them 
out. The bidder is required to examine 
carefully the site of the proposed work, 
the proposal, Bl~ns,.specifications, sup-
p~emental specifications, special provi-
sions, and contract forms before submitting 
a proposal. The submission of a bid shall 
be considered prima facie evidence that the 
bidder has made such examination and is 
satisfied as to the conditions to be en-
countered in performing the work and as 
to the requirements of the plans, speci-
fications, supplemental specifications, 
special provisions, and contract. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
Section 106. 02 of said specifications (Exh. D-1) 
governs the contractor's responsibility in providing rnateri· : 
als. In this contract there are no designated material 
sources. The section referred to says in part: 
• • • When material deposits are 
not designated in the special provisions, 
the contractor shall provide sources of 
acceptable material •.•• 
The section further outlines that the responsibility is on 
the contractor to secure and provide the source and to ex-
plore and develop it. The State is further required to test 
the material for its suitability. 
The record further discloses that Virgil Mitchell 
at the time of the alleged representation in March of 1973. 
was employed as an engineer's aid and accompanied Respondent
1
'· 
agents and employees as an accommodation to them. (R. 187, 
195-197} 
Respondent asserts that it relied on Mitchell's 
1 
"representation" in preparing and submitting its bid, and th'' 
-8- ; 
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Court has erroneously found this to be a fact and has 
allowed Respondent to recover for damages allegedly re-
sulting from increased haul distances in transporting 
borrow material to the job site from an alternate source. 
Appellant respectfully submits that Mitchell's 
statements do not amount to a positive representation or 
misrepresentation on the basis of the facts in evidence. 
(R. 8, 10, 12, 187, 200) Assuming a positive statement 
was made which Appellant asserts is not supported in the 
record, it is submitted that it was made without the 
authority of the State Engineer and the State herewith 
disclaims said representations or misrepresentations. 
On the basis of the evidence there is nothing to show 
that Mitchell had any authority to make any representa-
tions in conflict with the contract, plans, specifications, 
etc. No inquiry was made of Mitchell as to his authority. 
(R. 189, 193) 
The case of State v. Bates, 20 Ut.2d 75, 435 
P.2d 417, has enunciated the doctrine that the State is not 
bound by unauthorized statements of an employee absent a 
showing that the employee was "held out as having authority.P 
The court in that case said the following: 
An officer can, however, bind his 
government only by acts which come within 
the just exercise of his ~fficial ~owers 
and within the scope of his authorit~, un-
less the government held out the officer 
as having authority to do th7 acts. An • 
unauthorized act or declaration of ~n ~ff~cer 
does not estop the government from insisting 
on its invalidity. 
-9-
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It should be understood at this point that 
Mitchell was not authorized to make any representations 
other than those consistent with the plans and specifica-
tions. (Exh. D-1, Sec. 105. 09) (Also, R. 16) 
It is difficult to understand how the trial 
Court concluded that Respondent is entitled to rely on 
Mitchell's so-called "representations." There were four 
representatives of Respondent, including a civil engineer 
who examined the materials site. These men are experts 
in the field of road building and particularly road build-
ing materials. (R. 28) It is inconceivable that they would ' 
rely in any way on representations by Mitchell when they 
well knew that he was not the project engineer and when 
their own expertise in materials is so evident. 
At the very least the Respondent had a duty to 
inquire of Mitchell as to his authority if they wanted to 
rely upon statements made by him. 
The obvious conclusion is that the question of 
whether the material would meet the specification for borrow'· 
was probably not of concern to anyone. Almost anything will. 
meet the specification for borrow. (R. 28, 32-33) There was 
not much likelihood that Respondent was concerned about any-
thing except the fact of the materials availability from the· 
owner and what the price would be. Since Respondent cannot' 
show that they specifically inquired of Mitchell regarding 
the suitability of the material or that he in fact knew about 
-10-
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the materials inadequacy and failed to advise Respondent, 
it was error to charge Appellant wi'th · responsibility for 
the added costs of obtaining material from an alternate 
site. The United States Supreme Court has laid down guide-
lines in a series of cases as to when a contractor can and 
cannot recover for alleged misrepresentation: One of the 
leading cases is MacArthur Brothers Co. v. U.S., 258 u.s. 6, 
66 L.Ed. 433, 42 S.Ct. 255 (1922). The Court there said the 
following: 
In the case at bar the government 
undertook a project and advertised for bids 
for its performance but there was no knowl-
edge of impediments to performance, no mis-
representations of the conditions, exaggera-
tion of them nor concealment of them, nor, 
indeed knowledge of them. To hold the govern-
ment liable under such circumstances, would 
make it insurer of the uniformity of all work 
and cast upon it responsibility for all the 
conditions which a contractor might encounter 
and make the cost of its projects always an 
unknown quantity. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Appellant respectfully submits that the same 
standard applies to representations by Appellant, be they 
written or verbal. The Respondent must show in either 
event that Appellant had (1) knowledge of impediments to 
performance; (2) misrepresented those conditions; (3) ex-
aggerated them; or (4) concealed conditions. Here the 
Respondent has not shown that Virgil Mitchell had: (1) 
Knowledge that the Utelite Pit material was in fact un-
suitable; (2) that Mitchell in fact misrepresented condi-
-11-
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tions; (3) there is no evidence that Mitchell tried to 
build up the source or said anything about the source; 
(4) there is no evidence of concealment of any evidence 
of conditions by Mitchell. {How could he conceal anything 
if he didn't know anything?) 
Clearly the trial Judge has committed error in 
concluding that Respondent can rely on ''representations by 
Mitchell" and can therefore recover for the additional 
cost of going to an alternate source. 
Since the Court made no breakdown of damages which . 
I 
it awarded Respondent, there is no way to separate the amour.:' 
of recovery allowed Respondent for this erroneous award, and 
Appellant is therefore entitled to a new trial on this point 
alone. It is also entitled to directions to the trial Court 
not to allow recovery by Respondent for any damage related« 
the obtaining of borrow material from a source other than thi 
Utelite Pit. 
B. ESTOPPEL BY REASON OF MERGED CONVERSATION 
Appellant believes there is also a "merger" questi~ 
The conversation with Mitchell took place before the submiss:i 
of Respondent's bid. {R. 6-10) All conversations are there· 
fore merged under familiar principles of contract law. ThiS: 
Court stated the following in the case of National Sure~ 
v. Christiansen Brothers, Inc., 29 U.2d 460, 511 P.2d 731: I 
-12-
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. . • • • Where parties engage in nego-
tia ti~ns concerning a transaction pursuant 
~o ~hich they enter into a written contract, 
it ~s presumed that all matters relating to 
subJec~ are me:ged in and constitute a com-
plete integration of their agreement. 
Obviously, the agreement is silent as to material sites 
or representations of any kind relating to them, and Re-
spondent should therefore be estopped to assert anything 
concerning alleged statements by Mitchell since the con-
versation took place prior to the execution of the contract. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO TIMELY NOTIFY 
APPELLANT OF INTENTION TO CLAIM ADDI-
TIONAL COMPENSATION IS A WAIVER OF RIGHT 
TO RECOVER SAME UNDER THE CONTRACT, 
Respondent brought suit to recover additional com-
pensation for., among other things, (1) the increased costs 
of obtaining material from a borrow source located further 
away from the construction than the planned source; and (2) 
increased costs of widening roadway sections already completed 
or partially complete when directed to do so by the engineer. 
In the first instance there was no mention of a 
claim for additional compensation by Respondent during the 
period of construction. In the second case, there was appar-
ently a discussion between Dennis Weir of Respondent and the 
State's engineer, Ed Watson. Weir alleged in the discussi9n 
which was held either September 6 or September 9, 1973, that 
-13-
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they would need additional money, and Watson allegedly 
agreed to this. (R. 50) No dollar amount was discussed 
and nothing was said about filing a notice of a claim or 
being excused from filing a claim. 
In neither one of these instances was there a 
written notice filed by Respondent that it intended to 
claim additional compensation. 
Section 105.17 of the Standard Specifications 
reads in pertinent part as follows: 
If, in any case where the contractor 
deems that additional compensation is due 
him for work or material not clearly covered 
in the contract, • • • the contractor shall 
notify the engineer in writing of his in-
tention to make claim for such additional 
compensation before he begins the work on 
which he bases the claim. If such notifica-
tion is not given . . • then the contractor 
hereby agrees to waive any claim for such 
additional compensation. • • • 
This fact alone should defeat Respondent's claim to any 
additional compensation related to the obtaining of borrow 
material. In the absence of a waiver of said specifica-
tion, the Respondent is clearly bound to give the requisite, 
notice. 
ing that, 
Appellant asserts that the Court erred in decid· 
••• Mr. Weir and Mr. Watson had 
enjoyed a favorable working relationship 
in connection with other projects with which 
they had both been involved in the past. Mr. 
Weir relied on the statement of Mr. Watson 
-14-
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to the e~f7ct that Thorn would be paid what-
7ver additional costs were incurred in chan _ 
ing the turning radii, although a specific g 
amount was not agreed upon. 
Mr. Weir was never informed by Mr. Watson that 
he did not have to file a written notice. (R. 70) 
Secondly, Mr. Weir knew of the specification 
requirement and had in fact filed notices of this character 
on other projects. (R. 72) 
Since Mr. Watson did not tell Mr. Weir that 
he did not have to file a written notice of claim as re-
quired by the specifications, how can the Court conclude 
that Respondent had any right to rely on the statement of 
Mr. Watson that Thorn "would be paid" and that this excused 
Respondent from compliance with a contract provision? 
Appellant submits that far from sustaining 
Respondent's position, the facts of the matter indicate a 
waiver by Respondent of its right to compensation by its 
silence and failure to file the notice in advance or a 
claim for compensation until after the project was complete. 
Appellant in the absence of a notice of a claim by Respon-
dent was entitled to assume that Respondent was satisfied 
with the unit price and waived a claim for any additional 
payment. 
The obvious conclusion is that the Court was 
wrong in concluding as it did in Conclusion of Law No. 2 
that the provisions of Section 105.17 do not apply and that 
-15-
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the contractor is excused from giving notice of its intent 
to file a claim. 
This Court in the case of Zion's Properties, Inc. 
v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, said the following at page 1322: 
• • • unless there is some showing of 
legal excuse or justification for failure to 
perform the obligations of a contract, it 
must be enforced according to its terms. 
[Citing Puggi v. Skliris, 54 U.88, 179 P.79 
(1919)] 
This proposition applies even more forcefully 
when the State is a party. As the U.S. Supreme Court said , 
I 
in the case of Federal Crop Ins. Corporation v. Merrill, 331
1
· 
U.S. 380, 68 s.ct. 1, 92 L.Ed. 10: 
Whatever the form in which the 
goverrunent functions, anyone entering into an 
arrangement with the goverrunent takes the risk 
of having accurately ascertained that he who 
purports to act for the government stays within 
the bounds of his authority •.•. 
The record in fact shows that Appellant 1 s engineer 
Watson in response to a question from Respondent 1 s counsel 
about how he would characterize his relationship with Mr. 
Weir prior to the conversation about payment for the extra , 
I 
work of widening the curves radius said the following: (R. 11 ~' 
Well, up until after, with Mr. Weir or 
any other contractor representative, I try to 
establish a good rapport. However, I try to 
stay within the realms of the specification 
bands, because we know that is part of our-
well, I just don't know how to word it, but 
we have plaques on the wall that tell us what 
happened (sic) if we don't. 
Q (By Mr. Stewart) What do you mean by 
-16-
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A 
worded, 
you can 
Well, I don't really know how it is 
but if you get off the beat too far 
end up in San Quentin or wherever. 
This does not indicate any special relationship with 
Respondent contractor which justifies their reliance on 
this relationship as an excuse for failing to comply with 
a contract provision. 
To say that this "relationship" so-called justi-
fied Respondent ignores the explanation by the witness 
Watson in answer to a question by Respondent's counsel 
at page 243 of the Record as follows: 
Q (By Mr. Stewart) In your experience, 
and perhaps we ought to limit this, well, I 
won't limit it, but in your experience over 
the course of years is that there had been a 
time when you have gotten together with the 
contractor and agreed, without the formality 
of submission of a written request or a notice 
and actually agreed, to pay for extra work in 
an informal way? 
A I think on some minor items where the 
paper work would have cost more than the work 
itself, and I can't specify just what it could 
be, we might have paid for an item in a few 
loads of gravel or something to that effect 
that would be equal to the money involved. 
The facts are that Respondent under the law that pertains 
and the facts of this case cannot excuse itself from the re-
quirement of timely notice and the Court's conclusion to the 
contrary is clearly error, and the judgment should be reversed. 
POINT III 
SECTION 104.02 OF THE STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS 
LIMITS THE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES TO FIXED COSTS 
AND OVERHEAD FOR BID ITEMS WHICH UNDERRUN MORE 
THAN TWENTY-FIVE (25%) PERCENT. 
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The bid item of borrow in the original proposal 
is estimated to be 28, 100 cubic yards. The actual quantity 
measured and paid for pursuant to specifications is 15,305 
cubic yards. This results in an underrun in excess of twenty·. 
five percent (25%). 
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications 
allows relief to the contractor by way of supplemental agree·. 
ment in this event. ·The actual provision in pertinent part ! 
reads as follows: 
• • • The contractor agrees to accept 
the work as altered ••• provided, however, 
that if demand is made in writing by either 
party to the contract, a supplemental agree-
ment will be necessary before any alteration 
is made which involves any one of the follow-
ing: 
(3) An increase or decrease of 
more than 25% in the quantity of any major con-
tract item •• 
• The adjustment in compensation 
provided for under conditions (2) and l3 l 
above, • • • In the event of a decrease, 
any adjustments in payment shall apply to 
the quantity or quantities of work actually 
performed. 
In the case of decreased quantities of 
work, no allowance shall be made in the supple-
mental agreement for anticipated profits. · · · 
It should be noted that the foregoing provision 
contemplates that the supplemental agreement shall be worked 1' 
out before the change is made. In this case, the fact of the 
It was 
underrun in quantity was not anticipated in advance. 
I 
d t th conclu''~ not until the final quantities were calculate a e 
-18-
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of the project that the underrun was discovered. (R. 93) 
Past precedent within the Department of Trans-
portation has been to compensate the contractor for his 
fixed costs and overhead which he would not otherwise re-
cover because of the quantity underrun. (R. 303) The rea-
soning for this approach is that a contractor in determin-
ing his bid on a contract item would normally include his 
estimated costs of labor, materials and equipment; to this 
he would then add his fixed costs, overhead and profit. 
In theory then, it is reasonable in an underrun to pay only 
fixed costs and overhead. The specification does not allow 
for payment of profit, and the contractor has not incurred 
labor, material and equipment costs, so all that is left is 
the fixed costs and overhead. 
Respondent was requested to supply data regard-
ing how his bid was calculated. (R. 68-69 and Exh. D-12 and 
D-13) The Respondent failed to provide this information. 
(R. 69) 
The evidence at trial finally disclosed how the 
Respondent had calculated his bid price for the borrow item. 
The Respondent had estimated twenty-three cents for loading, 
thirty-seven cents for hauling, thirty-five cents for plac-
ing, and twenty-five cents for overhead, fixed costs and 
profit. (R. 88) 
Notwithstanding the failure to demand a supple~ 
· th ork the Appellant admits mental agreement before doing e w , 
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an obligation to pay the fixed costs and overhead on the 
underrun quantity of 12,795 cubic yards which calculates 
to something less than twenty-five cents per ton. 
This Court in construing this section of the 
State of Utah Standard Specifications in the case of Jack 
B. Parson Construction Co. v. State of Utah, 552 P.2d 107, 
chose to construe this section literally as it is written. 
With this precedent, Appellant submits that Respondent's 
claim for relief in the absence of a supplemental agreement 
before accomplishing the work should be denied. 
Appellant believes that in agreeing to compen-
sate Respondent for ''fixed costs and overhead," the Re-
spondent is placed in the same condition it would have been 
but for the underrun. It is further respectfully submitted 
that any recovery allowed over and above fixed costs and 
overhead must be supported by clear and convincing evidence 
that the Respondent has actually incurred the expense and 
that it is directly related to the pay item and could not 
have been avoided by Respondent. This the Respondent did 
not do during trial. The Respondent instead has taken the 
position that because of the quantity underrun he is en-
titled to recover his entire costs as calculated by "force 
account." The fact that he did not calculate his bid by 
means of "force account'' methods does not seem to trouble 
him. 
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The Utah Court in the old case of Wilson v. 
Salt Lake City, 52 U. 506, 174 P. 847 (1918) made a very 
pertinent observation concerning payment for extra work. 
The Wilson case involved a claim by the contractor for 
"extra work" which the City felt was not extra but "ad-
ditional" and therefore covered by contract prices. The 
case also involved a question of whether procedural re-
quirements had been followed. The Court stated the fol-
lowing at page 513: 
. • • Unjust and exorbitant demands 
are so often made for extra labor by those 
undertaking the work of constructing public 
improvements that the text writers have fre-
quently taken occasion to connnent concerning 
the claims of contractors for extra labor 
performed. We quote: 
'Municipal corporations have so 
frequently been defrauded by exorbitant 
claims for extra work under contracts for 
public improvements that it has become 
usual to insert in contracts a provision 
that the contractor shall not be entitled 
to compensation for extra work unless it 
has been ordered in a particular manner. 
19 R.C.L. 1077 (sec. 362) 
Experience, however, keeps a dear 
but a good school, and those who have a 
broader knowledge of such transactions 
agree that by some mysterious process.of 
calculation, things valued afterward in 
that way usually cost a great deal more 
than if contracted beforehand. In general, 
the ordering of the extra work must be made 
by the properly qualified agent of the per-
son to be charged. 4 Elliott on Contracts, 
Section 3740.' 
This case, it is respectfully submitted, exactly 
fits the type of situation the Wilson Court had in mind. Pro-
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r 
I 
cedural requirements were not followed in the instant case 
by Respondent to protect its claim. The engineer was not 
able to perform his duty vis-a-vis the claim since Respon-
dent refused to submit information regarding how his unit 
costs were affected. Now Respondent asserts a grossly 
inflated claim which makes no attempt to explain why the 
placement of seventeen percent (17%) of the total yardage 
can account for an overall increase in the unit price for 
borrow from $1.20 per yard to $3.72 per cubic yard. (Bid 
price was $1.20, $3.72 is derived by dividing total claim 
amount of $56,985.07 by yardage moved of 15,305 cubic yards.) 
The Respondent has either grossly inflated his claim, or he 
made a bad bid. The Appellant has no responsibility to under· 
write the "bad bid" and should not have to pay an inflated 
claim. Either way, the figure asserted by Respondent and 
the amount found by the Court cannot be supported by the 
evidence. 
This Court was indeed right in the case of ~ 
Rowland Construction Co. v. City of South Salt Lake, 7 Ut.2d 
273, 323 P.2d 258 (1958) when it said the following: 
• • • If contractors such as plain-
tiffs can make a competitive bid on a pro-
ject, omitting such a substantial item, then 
sue and recover on quantum meruit, it is 
readily seen what havoc could be wrought 
with the competitive bidding. 
• • • It would have to be considered 
as "extra work" beyond that specified in the 
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contract. In such event the contract 
clearly provides that it cannot be done 
and charge~ for wit?out written approval 
of the engineer, which admittedly was 
not done. 
In the instant case the contract clearly pro-
vides a procedure to be followed if the contractor desires 
to assert a claim for additional payment. Respondent did 
not follow the procedure, therefore the claim should be 
denied with the single possible exception that because of 
the quantity underrun in borrow which no one foresaw, the 
Respondent should recover his fixed costs and overhead not 
otherwise recoverable, which amounts to $1,791.30 on the 
basis of Respondent's testimony. 
Again, the Court's ruling gives us no basis to 
determine how much, if any of the judgment awarded by the 
Court, is based on·the quantity underrun. In fact, the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are silent as to whether 
any consideration was given to this item by the Court. Since 
there was considerable evidence before the Court on this 
question the Court may have considered it or may have re-
jected it. In any event, Appellant submits that without a 
determination in the Findings, Conclusions or Judgment there 
is no way to rationalize the Court's judgment. If the Court 
in fact awarded in excess of the sum conceded by Appellant 
($1,791.30), it is error in Appellant's opinion. The judg-
ment simply cannot be harmonized with the evidence unless the 
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Court breaks down the amount to disclose how it was arrived 
at to determine what is erroneous and what, if any, is pos-
sibly supported by the evidence. 
The Appellant is entitled to a new trial. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
ITS TOTAL COSTS ON A "FORCE ACCOUNT" 
THEORY AS THE TRIAL COURT HAS ERRONE-
OUSLY FOUND BECAUSE OF CHANGES ORDERED 
BY THE ENGINEER. 
During construction of the fill connecting the 
Rockport State Park Access Road to the highway (Wanship to 
Peoa) it was decided by Appellant that said fill should be 
widened, and in addition certain turning radii in the park 
access road were ordered widened. These changes were re-
quested on or about September 6, 1973, and the question of 
compensation was also discussed by Appellant's engineer, Ed 
Watson, and Dennis Weir, representing Respondent. (R. 47-49) 
There was no agreement reached regarding the amount to be 
paid Respondent for this additional work. (R. 105) Like-
wise, no claim as required by Section 10 5. 17 of the Stand-
ard Specifications was filed at any time while the project 
was under construction. (R. 70-72 and Finding of Fact No. Jli_ 
This point has already been discussed in this brief under. 
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Point II, supra, and that argument is herewith incorpo-
rated by reference. 
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications 
has already been referred to herein. (See Point III) 
That argument was related to the relief which is pro-
vided for in said Section when there is an underrun in 
a major item in excess of twenty-five percent (25%). 
The Court in its Conclusion of Law No. 4 
has concluded that Respondent is entitled to recover 
extra expenses incurred in widening the turning radii 
and does not have to submit data as to how its unit 
costs are affected, but can recover a "reasonable amount.• 
The Court then found $24,500.00 to be a "reasonable amount 
• for extra expenses incurred in transporting borrow 
material from the Crandall Pit and in widening the turn-
ing radii of the location where the new access road meets 
the existing roadway." 
There is no attempt in the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law or the Judgment to itemize the portion 
assigned to: (1) increased hauling costs and other costs in-
cidental to the alternate borrow pit over the originally 
planned pit; (2) the costs associated with the quantity un-
derrun in the bid item of borrow; and (3) the costs associ-
ated with widening the fill and turning radii of the new : 
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park access road. 
Appellant respectfully submits that the 
trial Court appears to have used an improper approach 
to determine the damages recoverable by Respondent for 
widening the approach road. At the very least it was 
error to allow Respondent to submit its evidence on a 
"total cost theory" which is the way Respondent submitted 
its evidence. Appellant objected to this approach at the 
commencement of trial and urged the trial Court not to 
allow evidence based on a "total cost" theory. (See R. 
4-6) Under the "total cost'' theory of damages the Appel-
lant becomes an unwilling insurer in effect. The Respon-
dent in this instance over Appellant's objections has addec 
up his total labor, equipment rental, overhead, fixed costs 
and profit to get a gross total cost. (R. 55-64 and Exhibit 
P-9 and P-10) From this figure he has deducted the amount 
paid under the contract unit price for the total amount of 
yardage moved and asserts that this represents his damages. 
The obvious problem with this approach is that it turns a 
competitive bid into a guaranteed profit contract. 
Section 104.02 of the Standard Specifications 
and particularly subsection (4) contains the following per· 
tinent language which Appellant asserts is directly applic· 
able to the instant case: 
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••• Written requests for a sup-
plemental agreement under condition (4) 
[Condition 4 refers to a change in the 
nature of the design or in the character 
of construction which measurably increases 
or decreases the unit cost of performing 
any item of work.] shall set forth in detail 
the particulars and character by which the 
work was changed and by what amounts the 
unit costs of the contract items will be 
altered. 
When it is determined by the 
Engineer that under the provisions of this 
subsection, a supplemental agreement is 
justified and an agreement satisfactory to 
both parties cannot be made, the Engineer 
may determine an amount which he feels is 
fair and equitable, and order the Contractor 
to proceed accordingly, or may order the work 
performed on a force account basis or cancel 
the work from the contract. If the work is 
performed at the adjusted price as established 
by the Engineer and the Contractor considers 
additional compensation is due him, he may 
request further consideration as provided in 
Article 105.17. 
Factually, in this case the following points are 
of importance: 
1. There was no request for a supplemental agree-
ment submitted by Respondent. 
2. There was a general recognition by Appellant's 
engineer in the September 6 meeting of a change in the plan or 
character of construction (condition 4) which qualified for 
additional compensation. 
3. There was no agreement as to the amount of 
additional compensation. 
4. There was no attempt at any time by Respondent 
to "set forth in detail the particulars and character by which 
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the work was changed and by what amounts the unit costs 
were altered." 
5. The engineer did not "determine an amount 
which he felt was fair and equitable," nor did he "order 
the work performed on a force account basis." 
6. Testimony of Dennis Weir was that about 
2,500 yards of 17% or the total yardage in the fill was in-
valved in widening of the fill. (R. 87) 
As to the "total cost theory" of damages, the 
best reasoned cases have rejected this approach or at the 
very least have allowed evidence of that nature as pre-
liminary only. 
In a recent case in California, entitled Huber, 
Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1977), the 
California Court of Appeal delivered a lengthy opinion in-
volving a suit by a contractor for damages arising out of 
the construction of the Fresno Civic Center. In this case 
the contractor-plaintiff attempted to submit a three-inch 
thick computer printout of items identified by cost coding 
as his evidence of damages. The Court refused to allow thi' 
as too confusing for the jury. The Court observed at page 
619 the following: 
•.• Contractor's entire attitude 
in the court below and in this court is that 
it is entitled to be compensated for all losses 
sustained over its original estimate. • • • . 
Stated in its simplest form contracto7' ~ po~i-, 
tion is that since the plans and specification-
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cont~ined errors and omissions and the 
architects were negligent in supervising 
the work and there were delays in complet-
ing the project and contractor sustained 
a loss, contractor should be made whole 
by architects .••• 
The Court further discussed the attempt by the contractor 
to prove damages under a total costs approach, including 
the attempt to justify this approach since that is the 
way its records are kept and it is "standard business 
practice." The Court then stated the following at page 
622: 
• • • If the computer printout was 
not organized in a manner to indicate the 
specific cause of particular cost overruns, 
a qualified accountant should have been able 
to make the calculations from the original 
records which were the source for the data 
fed into the computer. But nobody took the 
time and effort to make such calculations. 
No explanation is given for the failure. 
If we were to accept contractor's 
contention as to the law of this state, the 
result would for all practical purposes,~­
nullify all laws regarding competitive bid-
ding on public contracts. Under such a con-
cept, contractors could submit any bid neces-
sary to obtain the job knowing that the pub-
lic agency would be required to pay whatever 
costs contractor incurred on the project if 
contractor could discover some error or omis-
sion however irrelevant in the plans and 
specifications •••• (Emphasis supplied.) 
Appellant submits that the same reasoning applies in the 
instant case. For instance, why should Respondent recover 
any additional costs for the yardage delivered to the fill 
before it was widened? Why should Respondent be allowed to 
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recover anything additional without calculating exactly 
how much additional costs are involved with the 2,500 
yards hauled in to widen the existing fill? Stated in 
terms of the specification, why shouldn't respondent be 
required to "set forth in detail the particulars and 
amounts the unit costs of the contract items will be 
altered?" 
One of the leading cases cited by the California 
Court in Huber, supra, is the case of Boyaj ian v. U. s., 423 · 
F.2d 1231 (1970). This is a case decided by the U.S. Court 
of Claims and involves contract claims based on a ''total cos'. 
theory. The total claimed contract costs were $694,735.00 
and total receipts under the contract were $486,210.00 fora 
difference of $208, 525. 00 which plaintiff sought to recover. 
The Court in commenting on defendant's defense based on 
plaintiff's failure to prove damages, stated as follows: 
The so-called "total cost" method 
upon which plaintiff relies is here un-
acceptable. Accordingly, there is no need 
to make any determination on the merits of 
these three causes, for even assuming they 
are valid and that defendant's conduct 
amounted to the claimed breaches, plain-
tiff's failure to make any satisfactory 
showing of the amount of damages flowing 
from such breaches would require the dis-
missal of such causes anyway. 
The Court further observed as follows: 
• . . Recovery of damages for a breach 
of contract is not allowed unless acceptable 
evidence demonstrates that the damages claimed 
resulted from and were caused by the breach. 
"The costs must be tied in to fault on def en-
-30-
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dant's part." River Construction corp. 
v. U.S., 159 Ct.Cl. 254, 270 (1962) As the 
court held in J.D. Hedin Construction co. 
v. U.S., 347 F.2d 235, 259, 171 Ct.Cl. 70 
108 (1965): I 
As in all breaches of contract 
cases, the proper measure of damages for 
defendant's breaches is the amount of 
plaintiff's extra costs directly attrib-
utable to said breaches. [Citing Sadler 
v. U.S., 287 F.2d 411 (1961)) 
However, contrary to these basic 
causal connection damage principles, no 
attempt is here made to relate any specific 
amount of increased costs to any particular 
alleged breach. Nor is any satisfactory 
explanation given as to why such an attempt 
was not made or why it would not have produced 
reasonably accurate results. Instead, the dam-
age proof consists only of an accountant's 
schedule (and the accountant's testimony in 
support thereof), setting forth computations, 
based on plaintiff's books and records, of 
plaintiff's total expenditures in performing 
and subtracting therefrom the total contract 
receipts, thus arriving at a total "loss" 
figure, for which plaintiff demands recoup-
rnent. 
As was pointed out in J.D. Hedin Const. 
Co. v. U.S., supra, the ascertainment of in-
creased costs directly attributable to delay 
resulting from a breach of contract by defen-
dant is normally measurable with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy. 
It is settled, however, that a contractor 
is not entitled to recover "expenses" which would 
properly have been incurred regardless of the . 
[breach]. Sadler v. u.s., 287 F.2d 41, 415, 152 
Ct.Cl. 557, 564 (1961) 
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Other cases from the Court of Claims that 
have reached this same basic conclusion regarding the 
"total cost" approach are as follows: Christensen Con-
struction Corp. v. U.S., 325 F.2d 458, 163 Ct.Cl. 351; 
Lilley Ames Co., Inc., v. U.S., 293 F.2d 632, 154 Ct.Cl. 
549; Turnbull Inc., et al., v. U.S., 389 F.2d 1015, 180 
Ct.Cl. 1025. 
As to the adequacy of the proof submitted by 
Respondent, the Court of Claims in rejecting this submis-
sion of proof by an accountant's schedule said the follow-
ing in the case of River Construction Corp. v. U.S., 159 
Ct.Cl. 270: 
Recoverable damages cannot be 
proved by a naked claim for a return of 
costs even when they are verified. The 
costs must be tied in to fault on defen-
dant's part. 
The Court of Claims in the case of F.H.McGraw 
& Co. v. U.S., 130 F. Supp. 394, 131 Ct.Cl. 501 (1955) ma~ 
this very pertinent observation: 
••• The court, after stating that 
"[T]his [total cost] method of proving damage 
is by no means satisfactory, because among 
other things, it assumes plaintiff's costs 
were reasonable and that plaintiff was not 
responsible for any increases in cost, and 
because it assumes plaintiff's bid was ac-
curately computed which is not always the 
case, by any means," "flatly stated •• • 
approval was not given to proof of damages 
for breach of contract by showing the dif-
ference in plaintiff's bid and his costs on 
the entire job." 
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Finally, the Court in Boyajian v. u.s., supra, 
at P· 1244, ruled that where the record did not contain 
"reasonably satisfactory evidence" separate from that pre-
sented as in the instant case by an accountant's schedule, 
as follows: 
. . • • • T~e court has been obliged to 
dismiss the claim for failure of damage proof, 
regardless of the merits, citing Robertsv. u.s., 
357 F.2d 943; Snyder-Lynch Motors, Inc. v. U.S., 
297 F.2d 910, and River Const. Corp. v. u.s, 
supra, among others. 
Appellant submits that the most the Respondent 
is entitled to under the best reasoned cases is the opportunity 
to submit its evidence of damages sustained by reason of its 
being required to widen the approaches and turning radii. Fur-
ther it is submitted that Respondent had the burden of showing 
how its unit costs were affected by the change. Since the 
change only applied to 2,500 cubic yards, there is no reason 
to alter the unit price for the other yardage already placed 
when the change was ordered. If Respondent is entitled to 
recovery under force account payment, then it is again respect-
fully submitted that only the work accomplished subsequent to 
September 6, 1973 can qualify for consideration, and indeed 
only if this court finds that Respondent's failure to file a 
claim prior to doing the work is not procedurally fatal to the 
claim. 
The Respondent indeed has cavalierly admitted that 
it failed to supply information as to its unit cost of the con-
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tract i tern of borrow to Appellant al though it was requested 
to do so at least twice. (R. 68, 69) 
Since the Respondent failed to submit evidence 
under either approach there is no competent evidence before 
the Court for the Court to consider in assessing damages. 
The trial Court is obviously in error and had to resort to 
speculation to determine the amount it awarded Respondent as 
damages. The judgment should therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no way the judgment of the Court can 
be sustained based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. ·It is also evident from an examination of the recor: 
that the facts will not support a judgment against Appellant 
in excess of the sum of $1,791.30 conceded by Appellant if 
the law is properly applied. 
The Court found that Respondent was entitled to 
rely on the representations of Virgil Mitchell concerning 
the borrow site. However, it is clear from the record that 
the representation was a simple statement that it was avail· 
able as a "possible" source. The facts further demonstrate 
that Mitchell knew nothing about materials, was not instruct 
or authorized by Appellant's engineer Watson to say anythin~ 
about the borrow site, and further, that he did not know of 
"t 
any use of the area by any other contractor, or whether 1 
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was suitable. On the other hand, the facts show that 
Respondent's personnel are trained professionals in 
materials and were charged by specification requirement 
to make their own investigation, and the submission of 
a bid is prima facie evidence of their satisfaction as 
to conditions to be encountered. It is obvious error 
for the Court to permit Respondent to rely on the so-
called "representation" of Virgil Mitchell. 
The Court further found that Respondent was 
excused from specification requirements to give timely 
notice of its intent to file a claim for additional com-
pensation or to submit certain essential information show-
ing how its unit costs were affected by the alleged changes 
in plans or character of work. Again, the facts do not 
justify these findings and conclusions by the Court. There 
is no evidence that the State's engineer Watson had any 
special relationship with this Respondent contractor or 
that he customarily ignored specifications, or that he ex-
cused Respondent from complying with specifications. Further, 
there is evidence to show that Respondent knew of the notice 
requirement and had in fact complied with that requirement 
on other jobs. The law is clear both generally and specifi-
cally in this State that particular adherence is required to 
contractual provisions particularly where a public agency is 
involved. In other words, the court's findings and conclusions 
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in regard to contractual provisions are not supportable 
either factually or legally. 
The Court further committed error in permitting 
the Respondent to submit evidence of its damages by using 
a "force account" method which is the same as a "total cost" 
theory of damages, which theory has been rejected by the 
most prestigious Courts such as the United States Court of 
Claims and the State of California. A further analysis of 
the evidence before the Court which relates to damages shows 
that the "change in plan," if indeed it amounts to that under 
the specification, only affected seventeen percent (17%) of 
the total borrow amount. The Court on the other hand per-
mitted evidence to come in as if the entire bid item of bar· 
row was affected. This, it is submitted, violates the speci· 
fication, ignores the facts, and permits Respondent to com-
pletely circumvent its bid and reap a windfall. 
Finally, since the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment are all silent as to how the judgment 
amount was determined by the court, it is impossible to as-
certain what the Court considered in arriving at the judgmen: 
amount. At the very least Appellant is ent;i.tled to know wha:' 
the Court awarded for the elements of damage claimed by Re-
spondent, including those associated with the alternate bor· 
row site and the so-called "change in plans" or "character.cl 
construction." 
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It is respectfully submitted that this Court 
should reduce the judgment to the amount conceded of 
$1,791.30, or in the alternative, reverse the judgment and 
remand it for a new trial with instructions to eliminate 
any consideration for the alternate borrow site and to 
require Respondent to show, if it can, exactly how and in 
what manner its unit costs were affected only upon 17% of 
the borrow item and to allow recovery only upon a showing 
of actual damage, without being permitted to use a "total 
cost" approach to damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, Attorney General 
.~~-ELAN D. FORD 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two copies of the fore-
going Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Steven H. Stewart, Attorney for Respondent, 220 South Second 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 1st East, Suite No. 450, 
day of May, 1978. 
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